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Abstract 
This article complements the doctrine of termination of membership by arguing that 
at times international organizations (IOs) can still exert considerable normative effects 
on states that withdraw or express the intent to withdraw from them. We capture this 
continuing influence, which can collide with the exiting state’s intended goal of 
regaining control over specific issues, with a theoretical framework based on 
juridification as a socio-legal concept of systems theory in the international legal 
context. The aim is to explain the endogenous process of legal growth within the IO via 
bureaucratization and expert rule, which eventually affects the norms of the wider legal 
regime where the IO operates. With three case studies of IO exits, we illustrate the 
continuation of normative structures promoted directly or indirectly by the IO, 
according to two legal techniques of juridification: third-party interpretation on the one 
hand, and the extended reach of norms and processes through the work of non-state 
actors on the other. Overall, widening the theoretical perspective on state exits under 
systems theory can lead to more complete judgements on the tensions between domestic 
and supranational systems in the expansion of global normative regimes. 
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Introduction  
In 2001, Klabbers argued that perceptions about the role of international 
organizations (IOs)1 in the world order were changing.2 Being seen as an ‘embodiment 
of the dream of legislative reason’,3 IOs have multiplied in number, with the 
membership of global organizations, such as the UN and the World Trade Organization, 
dramatically expanding and seemingly following a pattern of constant progress. 
 
1 In this study, we understand IOs widely by including international institutions created under multilateral 
treaties, even if they lack international legal personality. See Henry G Schermers and Niels M Blokker, 
International Institutional Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 5th Revised, 2011) 45. We also attribute the same 
meaning to the terms ‘IOs’ and ‘international institutions’; as well as to ‘international institutional law’ 
and ‘law of international organizations’. 
2 Ian Klabbers, ‘The Changing Image of International Organizations’ in Jean-Marc Coicaud and 
Heiskanen (eds), The Legitimacy of International Organizations (United Nations University Press, 2001) 
221. 
3 Ibid 222. See also, José E Alvarez, ‘International Organizations: Then and Now’ (2006) 100(2) 
American Journal of International Law 324. 
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Nevertheless, what would have appeared as a steady path has also led to unexpected 
unilateral withdrawals of states from IOs (exits),4 thus signalling that, perhaps, IOs are 
no longer exclusively ‘considered to be a good thing’.5 
Exits from IOs can take place for all sorts of reasons and often states have used them 
for the strategic purpose of challenging particular situations within organizations, by 
later re-joining the ranks once an acceptable solution was reached.6 Yet, in the current 
period of ‘contested multilateralism’,7 the recent cases of ‘Brexit’ and the withdrawals 
of some states from the International Criminal Court8 have further highlighted the 
uneasy relationships between domestic orders and those developed multilaterally 
through the works of international institutions. 
 One of the causes of such tensions is the perception that the IO has ‘deviated from 
its original principles and purposes’9 and that the adoption of key domestic policies, 
often backed by popular support, has been thwarted by contrasting norms of the IO, 
which a single member state cannot justifiably oppose from within the organization. 
From this perspective, we do not find it sufficient to solely rely on the doctrine of 
termination of membership under international institutional law, given that this is 
 
4 For an overview of notable cases see Schermers and Blokker, above n 1, 98. 
5 Klabbers, ‘The Changing Image of International Organizations’, above n 2, 222. 
6 See Konstantinos D Magliveras, ‘Membership in International Organizations’ in Jan Klabbers and Aasa 
Wallendahl (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2011) 84, 98-101. Another technique is the temporary suspension of participation in the IO by 
the state: see the case of Indonesia’s suspension of activities in the UN below. 
7 Julia C Morse and Robert O Keohane, ‘Contested Multilateralism’ (2014) 9(4) The Review of 
International Organizations 385, 389–390. The concept defines current situations in world politics where 
states, coalitions and non-state actors engage in the creation of competitive multilateral institutions to 
challenge existing ones. Exits and their threat play the role of giving voice to the recalcitrant state or 
coalition. 
8 As of April 2018, South Africa and Gambia have taken back their notification to withdraw, while 
Burundi’s exit has taken effect in October 2017. In March 2018, the Philippines have filed a notification 
to withdraw from the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for 
signature 17 July 1998 2187 UNTS 3 (entered in force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3, Chapter XVIII. Penal 
Matters, 14. 
9 Magliveras, above n 6, 100. 
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limited to discipline the relations only between the IO and the exiting member (section 
1). Instead, we aim to explore those normative effects of the regime internal to the IO 
which can nonetheless outreach to the exited state, even after the formal termination of 
membership. In other words, in this article, we posit a theoretical understanding of cases 
where a state cannot fully escape the normative reach of an IO simply by formally 
exiting it.10 Accordingly, we first offer an outline of the tensions and limitations in the 
functional theory of IOs in encompassing events outside the direct relationship between 
state members and the IO (section 1). Following this discussion, we revamp the socio-
legal concept of juridification developed under systems theory,11 but intuited by 
international legal scholarship (section 2), which explains the constant growth of rules 
in an IO, fostered by expert rule and bureaucratization. In particular, in section 3 we re-
construct IOs as ‘organization systems’, participating in wider ‘function systems’. Their 
interactions enable an analysis of initial structures and patterns where exiting the 
organization system does not necessarily entail leaving its norms or processes, because 
of their continued presence in the wider function system.  
By applying this grid of analysis to three exit events or threats of exits involving, 
respectively, the first Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and 
the Paris Agreement on climate change (section 4), we reach two conclusions. 
Juridification not only stands at the roots of some exit events, but through informal 
 
10 Ramses A Wessel, ‘You Can Check out Any Time You like, but Can You Really Leave?’ (2016) 13(2) 
International Organizations Law Review 197. 
11 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique 
of Functionalist Reason (Beacon Press, 1985). 
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networks of communications by various legal actors –state or non-state– it moulds and 
perpetuates normative structures (section 5). 
 
1. Exits and the law of international organizations 
When dealing with unilateral state withdrawals from IOs (hereinafter ‘exits’), the 
prevalent focus of international institutional law scholars is on termination of 
membership.12 This has led to developing an exit doctrine in the law of international 
organizations, which systematizes the many interactions between state members and the 
IO under the law by relying on functionalism as its foundational theory. Its descriptive 
prong is that states act as principals to an autonomous agent entity (the IO) entrusted 
with performing a range of functions stemming from the constitutive agreement.13 The 
normative prong of functionalism, in turn, defines states both as members of the IO and 
parties to a multilateral treaty: consequentially, most authors rely on a dualist 
understanding of the relationship between the IO and its members under international 
law.14 When a state exits an IO, this can be regarded as a pure matter of treaty 
 
12 Stephen Mathias and Stadler Trengove, ‘Membership and Representation’ in Jakob K Cogan, Ian Hurd 
and Ian Johnstone (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations (Oxford University Press, 
2016) 963; Nagendra Singh, Termination of Membership of International Organisations (Stevens, 1957); 
CF Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) 117; Schermers and Blokker, above n 1, 98; Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, 
Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009); Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to 
International Institutional Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2009) 109–114; Alison Duxbury, 
The Participation of States in International Organisations: The Role of Human Rights and Democracy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011); Magliveras, above n 6. 
13 This is admittedly the prevalent conception of IOs and membership IOs. See Reparation for Injuries 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 174, 180.; see also Jan 
Klabbers, ‘Two Concepts of International Organization’ (2005) 2(2) International Organizations Law 
Review 277. See also Dan Sarooshi, International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers 
(Oxford University Press, 2005) 109, finding that agency cannot be presumed with regards to all powers 
exercised by the IO. 
14 See Georges Scelle’s doctrine of dédoublement fonctionnel, and the postulate of autonomous will as a 
condition for existence of an IO: Niels Blokker, ‘International Organizations and Their Members’ (2004) 
1 International Organizations Law Review 139; Nigel White, The Law of International Organisations 
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withdrawal by a state party, but also signifies the end of the membership status within 
the internal regime of the IO. Functionalism, which does not look beyond the 
connections between state members and the IO, has led to two main outcomes in the 
literature. 
First, it has spread unease. Indeed exits feature in many writings as drastic acts of 
rupture, having the final effect of undermining the constituted (liberal) order of the IO.15 
This take is particularly evident in those works which see in the burgeoning of IOs after 
the Second World War a sign of increased international co-operation (if not even 
constitutionalization) towards some positive values and aspirations.16 Second, it has 
generated a detailed doctrine with classical works offering a taxonomy of exits and their 
ensuing legal discipline through inductive explorations of constitutive instruments and 
notable cases –the main types being unilateral withdrawals of states, expulsions of 
members by the IO, and dissolution (of the state member or the IO).17 
 
(Manchester University Press, 3rd ed, 2016); Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Law of International Organizations 
and the Art of Reconciliation’ (2014) 11(2) International Organizations Law Review 428. 
15 Schermers and Blokker, above n 1. Sarooshi, above n 13. Expectedly, this attitude also emerged during 
the early discussions on the right to withdraw from the European Union (EU). During the negotiations for 
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Friel has compared the issue of withdrawal from EU to 
constitutional experiences in federal states, criticising how a draft withdrawal clause would threaten the 
stability of the EU and the withdrawing state. See Raymond J Friel, ‘Providing a Constitutional 
Framework for Withdrawal from the EU: Article 59 of the Draft European Constitution’ (2004) 53 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 407. 
16 Bardo Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter As Constitution of the International Community’ 
(1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529. See more extensively Anne Peters, ‘Membership 
in the Global Constitutional Community’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) 153, 201–219. 
17 See Schermers and Blokker, above n 1. Klabbers also mentions the suspension of membership rights in 
alternative to the expulsion of recalcitrant states, and the termination of membership in cases where 
amendments to the constitutive agreement are not accepted by a member: Klabbers, above n 12, 109–113. 
Similarly see Amerasinghe, above n 12, 117. Comprehensive works on the theme are Singh, above n 12. 
Duxbury, above n 12. Konstantinos D Magliveras, Exclusion from Participation in International 
Organisations: The Theory and Practice behind Member States’ Expulsion and Suspension of 
Membership (Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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Yet this analytical effort is also limited by the very tensions of dualism in the law of 
international organizations,18 which pose challenges in framing a coherent legal doctrine 
of exits. One can, for instance, take the vexed debate on unilateral withdrawals in the 
absence of an express clause in the constituent treaty,19 considering the ‘textbook case’ 
of Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN, to show how dualism can blur doctrinal clarity. 
After a notification to withdraw in 1965, a cessation of its participation in UN organs, 
and reshuffles in the composition of organs to substitute the empty Indonesian seats, 
Indonesia could nonetheless re-take its seat at the UN General Assembly in the 
following year, with the UN Secretary General deeming the events as evidence of a 
temporary cessation of co-operation rather than of membership.20 On this event, 
commentators of that period reacted with relief over the failed attempt of Indonesia to 
destabilize the UN,21 or maintained ambiguity in reconstructing this exceptional case as 
a formal withdrawal or a simple cessation of participation.22 
 
18 This difficulty in conciliating the two poles has recently re-emerged in Brexit debates concerning the 
possibility of unilateral withdrawal of the notification under Article 50(2) of the Treaty on the European 
Union and its constitutive effects over the exit procedure. For arguments based on the applicability of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, see Aurel Sari, ‘Reversing a Withdrawal Notification under 
Article 50 TEU: Can a Member State Change Its Mind?’ (2017) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2872152>. ; for a EU/member state centered approach Paul Craig, ‘The 
Process: Brexit and the Anatomy of Article 50’ in Federico Fabbrini (ed), The Law & Politics of Brexit 
(Oxford University Press, 2017) 49, 65. 
19 The viability of unilateral withdrawals without an exit clause in the treaty is still contested. Nigel White 
is of the view that it should not be allowed in any circumstance, but either induced from the intention of 
the parties or implied from the nature of the treaty. In the absence of any express or implied consent, 
states can withdraw only according to the rebus sic stantibus doctrine. See White, above n 14. 116-117. 
Contra see Schermers and Blokker, above n 1., 108 essentially claiming that the permissibility of 
unilateral withdrawals eventually depends on states practice and the arguments that the withdrawing state 
can take. Generally, see N Feinberg, ‘Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization’ (1963) 
39 British Year Book of International Law 189. 
20 Egon Schwelb, ‘Withdrawal from the United Nations: The Indonesian Intermezzo’ (1967) 61(3) The 
American Journal of International Law 661. 
21 Yehuda Z Blum, ‘Indonesia’s Return to the United Nations’ (1967) 16(2) International &amp; 
Comparative Law Quarterly 522. 
22 See Oscar Schachter’s interpretation as reported in Ibid 523. 
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This example confirms how functionalism conflates the principal/agent relationship 
between member states and the IO to a quasi-closed regime, somehow interacting with 
or being part of general international law.23 Thus functionalism is unable to recognize 
the normative effects of the IO’s regime outside its own boundaries after an exit event, 
including the effects over the ex-member state. 
While states might indeed withdraw from an IO for all sorts of reasons,24 more recent 
studies highlight how IOs and the growth of their normative frameworks can trigger 
exits due to tensions with domestic policies. For instance, following this perspective, 
Guzman explores state exits as a political strategy in reaction to the unexpected 
expansion of an IO’s powers.25 In an editorial in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, 
Wessel questions whether parties can really disentangle the Gordian knot of legal 
relationships between the EU, its members and third parties.26 Despite the intuitions, 
these recent studies and reflections lack a theoretical framework able to complement the 
functionalist perspective. Indeed, what the latter cannot comprehend are those instances 
where the law of an institutionalized regime (whether stemming from international legal 
sources or the internal law of the IO itself)27 can still exert normative effects on the ex-
state member, once an exit has taken place. If ‘functionalism has remained a theory 
about relations between the organization and its member states [where] other 
dimensions simply do not and possibly cannot, enter the picture,’28 then we find it 
 
23Jan Klabbers, ‘The Transformation of International Organizations Law’ (2015) 26(1) European Journal 
of International Law 9; Lorenzo Gasbarri, ‘The Dual Legality of the Rules of International Organizations’ 
(2017) 14(1) International Organizations Law Review 87. 
24 Magliveras, above n 6, 98–99. 
25 Andrew Guzman, ‘International Organizations and the Frankenstein Problem’ (2013) 24(4) European 
Journal Of International Law 999, 1007–1009. 
26 Wessel, above n 10. 
27 Gasbarri, above n 23. 
28 Jan Klabbers, ‘Transforming Institutions: Autonomous International Organisations in Institutional 
Theory’ (2017) 6(2) Cambridge International Law Journal 105, 119. 
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worthy to explore what is outside of the functionalist legal doctrine of exits. With this 
aim, the next section will assess how juridification –a phenomenon of constant 
expansion of the law in social systems, including IOs– features in the international legal 
debate and can serve as a useful conceptual took to look beyond functionalism. 
 
2. Juridification in international legal scholarship 
Concepts akin to juridification have surfaced in international legal discourse in 
different contexts, meanings and analytical uses. Yet, we can pinpoint two approaches 
outside systems theory for their relevance and analytical development in the literature. 
The first concerns the law of international organizations and centres on the use of 
‘constitutional growth’ as a metaphor in the development of major IOs.29 As Sinclair 
finds, since the end of the Second World War, international lawyers and civil servants 
have adopted a dynamic conception of IOs in terms of their function and law-making 
powers, in order to accommodate the need to adapt the IO to new events and political 
shifts. The constitutional growth of IOs has worked as an argumentative tool to advance 
the idea of change and expansion of IOs’ powers and functions via formal and informal 
means. This is a process internal to IOs, which reflects a functionalist understanding of 
the relationship between member states and the autonomous entity they create. Whilst 
on the formal level expansion is facilitated through the works of specific doctrines in 
international institutional law,30 the more informal processes of constitutional growth 
 
29 Guy Fiti Sinclair, To Reform the World: International Organizations and the Making of Modern States 
(Oxford University Press, 2017) 18. Others have referred to it as ‘constitutive juridification’: see Lars Chr 
Blichner and Anders Molander, ‘Mapping Juridification’ (2008) 14(1) European Law Journal 36, 39. 
30 For instance, the doctrine of implied powers, the principle of attribution and speciality, and the doctrine 
of competence of organs. These have been mostly formulated through the advisory opinions of the 
International Court of Justice and the work of the International Law Commission. See Guy Fiti Sinclair, 
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within IOs are also relevant and take the form of rhetoric by leading figures in the IO, 
the re-imagining of established IOs activities, or the creation of new ones.31 All these 
elements are related to empowerment of expert rule and bureaucratization through the 
language of law.32 Moreover, constitutional growth can lead to situations where IOs 
considerably depart from the original vision that member states encapsulated in the 
constitutive agreement, yet without evidently entering the ultra vires zone. Guzman 
labels this phenomenon as the ‘Frankenstein problem’ in international institutional law 
and pays attention to design techniques in the constitutive agreement for more effective 
management of the IO’s expansion and retraction of powers.33 
The second strand of the international legal literature linked to juridification can be 
traced back to the beginning of the new millennium when several US-based authors 
have started promoting ‘legalization’ as a concept for rational behaviour analysis of 
international law and international relations.34 Abbott et al. define legalization as a ‘set 
of characteristics’ which institutionalized regimes possess in various degrees. These 
traits are termed respectively obligation, precision and delegation, and capture the 
various gradients in which institutionalized regimes are governed by ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ 
law,35 the level of determinacy of their rules, and the extent of delegated powers given 
 
‘State Formation, Liberal Reform and the Growth of International Organizations’ (2015) 26(2) European 
Journal of International Law 445, 449–450. 
31 Sinclair, for instance, highlights the leadership role of the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, 
in the creation and justification of UN peacekeeping intervention during the Congo crisis. Similarly, 
Albert Thomas, nominated as Office Director of the International Labor Organization, was behind the 
development of technical assistance activities in member states. See Sinclair, above n 29. Generally, see 
José Enrique Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford University Press, 2005) 328. 
32 See Blichner and Molander, above n 29, who identify in these processes another form of juridification. 
33 Guzman, above n 25. 
34 A strand of the literature criticized for its limitedness to a liberal international relations analysis of 
international law. See Martha Finnemore and Stephen J Toope, ‘Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer 
Views of Law and Politics’ (2001) 55(3) International Organization 743. 
35 This is a view espousing ‘relative normativity’ in international law. In the context of positivist 
approaches, see Ulrich Fastenrath, ‘Relative Normativity in International Law’ (1993) 4 European 
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to third parties to apply and enforce these rules.36 With these three coordinates, the 
authors do not identify any ideal superiority to specific forms of legalization, but rather 
use the concept to categorize international regimes and determine the political strategies 
that states are likely to adopt as rational actors in the multilateral domain. While much 
attention is given to international regime designs to explain their cost/benefit 
consequences, ‘regime exit’ strategies are not considered,37 although they would likely 
fit within the realm of strategic responses to legalization. This latter aspect has been 
further developed by Helfer, who concentrates on exits from human rights regimes 
prompted by ‘overlegalization’. In his account, the prefix ‘over’ determines a situation 
with ‘more extensive changes to national laws and practices than was the case when the 
state first ratified the treaty, generating domestic opposition to compliance or pressure 
to revise or exit from the treaty’.38 This study, which looks at the legalization of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean human rights regime and responses by some of its states,39 is 
the most detailed conceptualization of juridification and its linkage to treaty exits in the 
literature. However, it lacks a clear reference to the role of IOs and international 
institutional law in the process and rather concentrates on the backlash that increased 
legalization exerts on the effectiveness of the said regime and international relations 
theories.40 Helfer has also offered an extensive empirical study of multilateral treaty 
exits, discovering how states quit multilateral treaties with a fair degree of regularity 
 
Journal of International Law 305. Contra Prosper Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International 
Law?’ (1983) 77(3) The American Journal of International Law 413. 
36 Kenneth W. Abbott et al, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54(3) International Organization 401. 
37 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 54(3) 
International Organization 421. 
38 Laurence Helfer, ‘Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes’ (2002) 102 Columbia Law Review 
1832, 1854. 
39 The same case is also analyzed below according a revised conceptualization of juridification. See 
below section 4. 
40 Helfer, above n 38. 
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and considering the effect of withdrawal clauses on ‘exit costs’ in case of unwanted 
outcomes from the agreement.41 Yet the same analysis turns to the politics of treaty 
exits assuming rational behaviour from states and does not look at the role of IOs and 
their internal law and regulatory processes in the context of legalization. 
Overall, although several international law scholars have theorized the idea of 
incremental stages of legal growth of IOs, they have not paid systematic attention to the 
specific normative effects of such development, which can take place outside the 
institutional regimes. Also, they do not offer a framework able to comprehend how 
juridification can be at the same time one of the causes of an exit, but also the means for 
extending the juridified regime internal to the IO on the exiting state. 
3. Systems theory, juridification and exits  
This section sets up a descriptive and normative framework of exits from the 
sociology of law and systems theory based on juridification.42 By viewing IOs as 
‘autopoietic social systems’ participating in a wider international legal regime (‘function 
system’),43 we provide explanations as to why juridification occurs and why states may 
object to this juridification by exiting IOs. Moreover, we dissect how the normative 
effects of juridification spread through the wider function system and continue affecting 
the exiting state. 
 
41 Laurence Helfer, ‘Exiting Treaties’ (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 1579, 1608. 
42 For a positioning of systems theory within contemporary approaches to international law see: Ingo 
Venzke, ‘Contemporary Theories and International Lawmaking’ in Research Handbook on the Theory 
and Practice of International Lawmaking (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 77. 
43 Function systems deal with specific subject matters contrasted with organization systems. An IO is an 
organization system but also participates to function systems (for example, international human rights law 
etc). 
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To better understand the process, it is necessary to go back to the theory which first 
underpinned the concept of juridification in domestic legal systems. The idea of 
juridification (‘Verrechtlichung’) uses concepts from systems theory and has been 
popularized at the beginning of the 20th century by the German doctrine in the context 
of the massive regulatory expansion of the welfare state model.44 In particular, 
Habermas45 defined juridification as ‘the tendency towards an increase in formal (or 
positive, written) law that can be observed in modern society’46 composed as ‘the 
expansion of law, that is the legal regulation of new, hitherto informally regulated social 
matters, [and] the increasing density of law’.47 It is also possible to distinguish a recent 
move from juridification by ‘direct regulation of behaviours to a more indirect 
regulation of procedures’.48 
Lately, the approach has also been applied to the international sphere,49 with the 
process of juridification in IOs manifesting in the wider context of global 
constitutionalism. For Habermas (and Teubner), the multiplication of specialized 
regimes50 is a direct consequence of the juridification of international law through 
constitutionalization.51 However, specialized regimes are not necessarily coordinated or 
 
44 Gunther Teubner, ‘Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions’ in A Reader on Regulation 
(Oxford University Press, 1998). 
45 Habermas, above n 11. 
46 Ibid 356. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Teubner, ‘Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions’, above n 44, 424. 
49 Gunther Teubner and Andreas Fischer-Lescano, ‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity 
in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25(4) Michigan Journal of International Law 999; Lena 
Hilkermeier and Mathias Albert, ‘Organizations in/and World Society A Theoretical Prolegomenon’ in 
Mathias Albert and Lena Hilkermeier (eds), Observing International Relations : Niklas Luhmann and 
World Politics. (Taylor and Francis, 2003) 177; Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West (Polity, 2006). 
50 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, ‘International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art 
of the State’ (1986) 40(4) International Organization 753. Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, above n 49. 
51 Habermas, above n 49, 115; Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System (Oxford University Press, 2008); 
Gunther Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization. (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 8. 
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part of a unidirectional movement52 and they can even ‘collide’.53 Whatever their links, 
regimes rely on law’s expansion and differentiation.54 For Teubner and Fischer-
Lescano, the societal fragmentation induced by globalization ‘impacts upon law in a 
manner such that the political regulation of differentiated societal spheres requires the 
parcelling out of issue-specific policy-arenas, which, for their part, juridify 
themselves’.55 Put simply, it means that the breaking up of globalization in various 
spheres is done through a juridification process.  
Within this general configuration, systems theory constructs organizations as 
‘autopoietic’ (self-reproducing) social systems. ‘Organizations consist of decisions and 
these decisions are recursively linked to each other’.56 As a consequence, an 
organization is normatively closed but informationally open against any events coming 
from the external environment, meaning that legal acts not recognized by the system 
have no legal value but any act or event occurring in the system can be used to justify a 
decision.57  
An IO can be considered as an autopoietic social system as soon as it differentiates itself 
from the constituting member states and begins deciding on the operation of the 
constitutive treaty (the ‘legal code’ of the organization) based upon its own 
interpretation. The relationship between juridification and autopoiesis is made apparent 
by Bohman, as the term ‘juridification’ points to the idea of a ‘legal domination [which] 
 
52 Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
53 Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, above n 49. 
54 Blichner and Molander, above n 29, 42. 
55 Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, above n 49, 1009. 
56 Hilkermeier and Albert, above n 50, 186. 
57 Luhmann, above n 51, 60. Tor Hernes and Tore Bakken, ‘Implications of Self-Reference: Niklas 
Luhmann’s Autopoiesis and Organization Theory’ (2003) 24(9) Organization Studies 1511. 
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is not simply tyranny, but rather the imposition of a cooperative scheme upon others 
who cannot influence or revise its terms.’58 The juridification of IOs leads to an 
autopoietic social system, so that ‘in the field of law, autopoietic self-reference means 
that its validity is based solely on legal normativity and that legal validity has definitely 
freed itself from all extra-legal connections – politics, morality, science’.59 Therefore, 
the IO needs to be sufficiently juridified to be treated as an autopoietic social system.  
On that basis, decisions within IOs can only happen according to their internal rules 
with the organization system being operationally closed or bounded.60 At the same time, 
social systems are informationally open to their environment.61 But the way they receive 
information from the environment happens only according to their own code. Thus, it is 
possible for IOs to use general international law or any other form of information 
coming from their environment, but that will only happen through the ‘structural 
coupling’62 between the systems. For IOs, this means that external information will be 
received only according to their interpretation of their constitutive treaty (for example, it 
could be rejected on the basis of lex specialis or integrated on the basis of general 
international law).  
This feature of IOs as social systems explains why they only function according to 
their legal code, and register contrasting positions taken by member states only, and 
only if, this code permits it. This does not mean that decisions on the legality of 
behaviours cannot depart from a literal view of what the constitutive document allows. 
 
58 Cited by Blichner and Molander, above n 29. 
59 Teubner, ‘Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions’, above n 44, 406. 
60 Tor Hernes and Tore Bakken, above n 57. 
61 Luhmann, above n 51, 110–111. 
62 ‘Coupling mechanisms are called structural couplings if a system presupposes certain features of its 
environment on an ongoing basis and relies on them structurally’, Ibid 382. 
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Allowing such a reading only depends on what the actors of the social system accept as 
being legal.63 
Under this perspective, the tensions created in the process of ‘structural coupling’ 
between law and politics within juridified IOs becomes a major issue for domestic 
systems. In domestic law, this coupling is produced by the constitution,64 while, in 
democracies, it is formally secured by attributing specific authority to the elected 
politicians and other representative authorities. However, it is partially lacking within 
juridified IOs. This means that member states cannot behave in accordance with the 
IO’s regime by merely asserting an interpretation of their obligations as aligned with 
their domestic interests.65 
The distance between domestic politics and decisions of the IO through weak 
structural coupling is compounded by several processes at play within IOs due to 
juridification. Bureaucratization is one of the most prominent ones.66 According to 
Weber, a bureaucracy is the ‘purest type of exercise of legal authority’,67 and as such a 
development of law demands an expansion of administration. The second is the rise of 
expert rule,68 whereby legal experts come to make the key decisions on how to interpret 
the constitutive treaty and the associated rules. 
 
63 Thus, we are not concerned as to whether decisions made within an organization system are potentially 
ultra vires under the constitutive treaty. What matters here is that the decision is made and accepted 
within the system itself.  
64 Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, above n 49. 
65 Prior to juridification, the state could use interpretative declarations as accepted in general international 
law. 
66 Ingo Venzke, ‘International Bureaucracies from a Political Science Perspective – Agency, Authority 
and International Institutional Law’ in Armin Von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann and Matthias Goldmann 
(eds), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions (Springer, 2010) 67. 
67 M Weber and T Parsons, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Free Press, 1968) 277. 
68 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 
70(1) The Modern Law Review 1. 
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The very broad terms used in many international agreements can initially be chosen 
to allow states to join in, even in light of substantial disagreements. However, once 
expert rule starts and the interpretation of key terms is left to a third-party, states find it 
more difficult to express and act according to their different viewpoints without being 
seen to be in breach of the IO’s rules. Furthermore, bureaucratization entrenches the 
differences between the IO, as a social system, and its environment, as it relies on a 
growing body of internal rules to decide on its own operations.69 
As decisions within the juridified IO increasingly stem from some self-defined 
objectives, rather than genuinely reflecting the collective or individual interests of the 
member-states, clashes between IO supervisory organs and some states are likely to 
happen,70 with one rational response being to quit this social system. Under this logic, 
exits effects should be for the decisions of the IO to no longer affect the state. 
However, international regulation does not only happen through participation in 
international organizations, but increasingly also via state participation in specialized 
parallel regimes71 generating interaction via conflicts and linkages.72 The behaviour of a 
state is going to be constrained not only because of the membership of an organization, 
but also through participation in the wider functional regime where the IO operates. 
Systems theory extensively explains this process.73 It describes how the decisions of the 
organization are a social system, but at the same time any decision of the organization 
or ‘communication within and of an organization is always also communication within 
 
69 Habermas, above n 11, 306–307. 
70 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Hegemonic Regimes’ in Margaret A Young (ed), Regime Interaction in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 305. 
71 Kratochwil and Ruggie, above n 50. Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, above n 49, 1005. 
72 Some of these issues have also been discussed under the term of ‘informal international law making’. 
See in particular: Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel and Jan Wouters (eds), Informal International 
Lawmaking (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
73 Hilkermeier and Albert, above n 49. 
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a function system’.74 The IO, then, participates in ‘function systems’ of the international 
society, such as those concerned with human rights, international investments or climate 
change. As a consequence, the IO must be seen as both an organization system 
(distinguished from their environment by deciding on membership other issues75) and as 
a function system of the international society (dedicated to produce communications on 
a specific subject). As each system is independent and autopoietic, there is no hierarchy 
between them. This is fully applicable to the international legal order where there is 
neither hierarchy between organizations, nor between regimes.  
Even though such systems lack the formal constitutive instrument of an IO, they 
grow as function systems in connection to IOs, by developing the core characteristics of 
an autopoietic legal system, namely self-reference and self-reproduction.76 For these 
reasons, the concept of juridification not only enables us to widen the perspective on the 
normative relationships between exiting states and IOs, but also the limitations of exits. 
Under the formalist approach of international institutional law, exit only matters within 
the organization system, as the state is no longer a member of that organization and 
party to the constitutive instrument. However, exit might have a limited impact on the 
function system, depending on the extent and reach of juridification of the IO beyond its 
boundaries. Systems theory charts the less noticed paths where, despite the conflictual 
relationship between the juridified IO and the exiting state, the expected legal 
positioning of the latter outside the IO’s influence is nonetheless negated by the 
 
74 Ibid 183. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Teubner and Fischer-Lescano, above n 49. For a discussion of the possibility of these function regimes 
and a further analysis of the problems of coordination: see also Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: 
Legal Pluralism in the World Society in Global Law without a State (Brookfield, 1997) 13–19; Stefan 
Oeter, ‘International Law and General Systems Theory’ German Yearbook of International Law 72, 75–
76. 
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normative effects and constraints created by juridification itself. Therefore, the impact 
of the function regime will happen due to the necessary participation of the exiting state 
in the globalized world society which has produced these function systems. 
In the next section, three exit case studies illustrate how juridification and its 
consequences have played out in different IOs and legal regimes. 
 
4. Three cases of juridification and exits 
In this section, three case studies illustrate how juridification generates normative 
effects beyond the organization system of IOs in case of exits (intended or executed). 
Not only for each case, the decision to exit has been justified also by reference to an 
incompatibility with the constitutional order, or democratic (il)legitimacy, but the 
juridification has also continued to produce constraints on the exiting states, limiting the 
intended impact of the exit. 
 
4.1. Exiting the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
International human rights law can partly be seen as a function regime as the 
informal coordination of supervisory bodies produces unified interpretations. This view 
is centred around the bundle of international human rights organizations and bodies 
under the UN and at the regional level. The International Court of Justice in the Diallo 
case exemplifies the use of convergent interpretations of human rights bodies as well as 
the recognition of the dominance of the Human Rights Committee, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights as the core 
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institutions of this function system.77 The Strasbourg Court has also endorsed this view 
by using the ‘consensus emerging from specialized international instruments’ in order to 
interpret the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).78 The 
regime actors even extend to include domestic courts.79 The function system is thus 
organised through self-reference of the various connected actors.  
Jamaica’s and Trinidad and Tobago’s withdrawals from the first Optional Protocol of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (OP-ICCPR)80 and the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)81 are good examples of how the 
participation in the organization system also triggers a participation in the wider 
function regime. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have used exits as a first reaction to 
the juridification of human rights imported from international human rights law, 
rendering it impossible to legally implement the death penalty. In 1997, Jamaica 
denounced the first OP-ICCPR to bar individual communications to the Human Rights 
Committee,82 and in May 1998, Trinidad and Tobago withdrew from both the first 
Optional Protocol83 and the ACHR84. Each act was momentous and seen as a significant 
blow to the international human rights system, being the first of a kind.85 Still, the 
 
77 The ICJ had to interpret in substance article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the 
Congo) (Judgment) [2010] ICJ Rep 639, [66]–[68]. 
78 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC] [2008] Eur Court HR 1345.  
79 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on 
Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 499. 
80 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
81 Opened for signature 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 1 (entered into force 18 July 1978). 
82 Natalia Schiffrin, ‘Jamaica Withdraws the Right of Individual Petition Under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (1998) 92(3) The American Journal of International Law 563. 
83 Trinidad and Tobago rejoined the OP-ICCPR with a death-penalty related reservation in August 1998. 
However as this reservation was later found to be illegal by the Human Rights Committee, it denounced 
the OP-ICCPR again. This time for good. See Yogesh Tyagi, ‘The Denunciation of Human Rights 
Treaties’ (2009) 79(1) British Yearbook of International Law 86, 174–175. 
84 Helfer, above n 38. 
85 Schiffrin, above n 82. Tyagi, above n 83. 
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juridification process went beyond withdrawal. In social systems terminology, the 
withdrawal has only affected the participation in the organization system, not the 
function system of human rights law. 
In Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (as in other Caribbean countries which are part 
of the British Commonwealth), the UK Judicial Committee of the Privy Council86 has 
remained the highest court after independence.87 In that capacity, it provides a judicial 
review based on the rights guaranteed by the domestic constitution; these rights include 
the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
In Pratt v. Attorney-General for Jamaica,88 the Privy Council decided that the 
Jamaican constitution had to be applied in line with the interpretation provided by 
international human rights law seen as a function system. It referred to an array of 
decisions of domestic courts (US and Indian Supreme Courts) and international organs 
(Committee of Human Rights, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and even 
the European Court of Human Rights and its landmark Soering case89). It found that 
there was a consensus to the view that the death row phenomenon (the considerable 
time spent prior to execution due to various appeals as well as stressful detention 
conditions)90 could amount to an inhuman and degrading treatment.  
The Privy Council stated that any death row which lasted more than 5 years 
(including 18 months to deal with an international procedure under the ICCPR or the 
 
86 For an overview of the role of the Privy Council: see Neuberger, ‘The Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council in the 21st Century’ (2014) 3(1) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 30. 
87 Antoine, Rose-Marie B., ‘Waiting to Exhale: Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems’ 
(2005) 29 Nova Law Review 141. 
88 [1994] 2 AC 1. See William A Schabas, ‘Soering’s Legacy: The Human Rights Committee and the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Take a Walk down Death Row’ (1994) 43(4) The International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 913. 
89 Soering v United Kingdom [1989] 11 EHRR 439. 
90 Schabas, above n 88. 
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ACHR) would constitute an inhuman or degrading treatment, thus incompatible with 
the Jamaican constitution. This meant that after 5 years on death row, a death penalty 
had to be commuted to a life sentence.91 As a result, it was no longer possible for these 
states to implement the death penalty, even if both the ICCPR and the ACHR explicitly 
accept such limitations to the right to life,92 as death row inmates systematically applied 
to either the Human Rights Committee or the Inter-American Commission and 
benefitted from the slow working of the domestic judicial systems.93 
At the time of Pratt, an overwhelming majority of the population of both countries 
were in favour of resuming the imposition of the death sentence.94 The exits were 
triggered in response to these domestic pressures. However, the moves were 
unsuccessful on their own terms. The most obvious limit was that Jamaica exited from 
the first OP-ICCPR but did not remove the right of individual applications to the Inter-
American Commission under the ACHR. Additionally, international and domestic 
pressure continued to be applied. Both states are members of a series of UN human 
rights supervisory mechanisms (UN Universal Periodic Review, special mechanisms 
etc.) which have persistently affirmed that the death row phenomenon is in breach of 
UN human rights standards.95 More importantly, despite the denunciation, the case-law 
of the Privy Council became even more specific, leaving fewer options for the states 
concerned,96 by continued reference to international human rights norms.  
 
91 James Campbell, ‘Murder Appeals, Delayed Executions, and the Origins of Jamaican Death Penalty 
Jurisprudence’ (2015) 33(2) Law and History Review 435. 
92 ICCPR, art 6(2); ACHR, art 4(2).   
93 Campbell, above n 91. 
94 96% in Trinidad and Tobago, 87% in Jamaica. Helfer, above n 38, 1885. 
95 See for instance: for Jamaica, the Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture of 2010. 
A/HRC/16/52/Add.3  
96 Thomas v Baptiste [2000] 2 AC 1. Appeal stemming from Trinidad and Tobago. 
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As dramatic evidence of this continued domestic pressure, Jamaica made the choice 
of revising its bill of rights found in the constitution.97 In order to deal with the death 
row phenomenon, the amended bill of rights includes the death penalty as an exception 
to the right to life, but also states specifically in section 13(8)(a) that the duration of 
time spent on death row cannot be read as being an inhuman and degrading treatment. 
Finally, both states have tried to move away from the Privy Council and join a new final 
court of appeal, the Caribbean Court of Justice. But as of April 2018, the Jamaican 
Parliament has still been unable to pass the necessary legislation, and even then, the 
Caribbean Court of Justice has also started referring to the international human rights 
regime to help to interpret domestic norms.98 This illustrates the staunch resistance by 
domestic actors to the resumption of the death penalty, partly by the empowerment 
provided by international human rights interpretation,99 as well as the pervasive role of 
the function system of human rights law. 
Overall, the exits from the individual application systems evidently created an end to 
their applicability. However, participation in the increasingly juridified regime of 
human rights law has not stopped, with an ongoing interaction between the international 
human rights regime and the domestic constitutional protections seriously impeding the 
possibility to legally resume the execution of the death penalty. Helfer has used these 
examples in light of juridification100 to contend that ‘overlegalizing human rights can 
lead even liberal democracies to reconsider their commitment to international 
 
97 Derek O’Brien and Se-Shauna Wheatle, ‘Post-Independence Constitutional Reform in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean and a New Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms for Jamaica’ [2012] 
(October) Public Law 683. 
98 Salvatore Caserta, ‘The Contribution of the Caribbean Court of Justice to the Development of Human 
and Fundamental Rights’ (2018) 18(1) Human Rights Law Review 170. 
99 O’Brien and Wheatle, above n 97, 692. 
100 Helfer, above n 38, 1836. 
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institutions that protect those rights’.101 Such an issue, is no longer a mere intellectual 
debate also in Europe. Several UK Prime Ministers have seriously considered the 
possibility of withdrawing from the ECHR and such a withdrawal has been part of UK 
political debate since 2005.102 For the time being, it seems that the idea has been 
shelved, but it may arise again once the Brexit issue has been solved. 
 
4.2. Exiting the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes  
The second case concerns Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela’s exits from the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The effects of 
juridification by ICSID and its tribunals (the organization system) in the international 
investment regime (the function system) not only played a key role in prompting exits 
from this IO, but also appear to perpetuate established features of investor-state 
arbitrations in an alternative dispute settlement organization currently under negotiation. 
At a meeting of the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America (ALBA) in 
April 2007, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela jointly declared their intention to withdraw 
from the ICSID Convention103 and terminate their membership in response to the threats 
of multinational enterprises resorting to ICSID arbitrations.104 Bolivia was first to 
denounce the Convention in May 2007,105 with Ecuador and Venezuela following suit 
 
101 Helfer, above n 38. 
102 Katja S Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks and Loveday Hodson, ‘The UK and European Human Rights: A 
Strained Relationship?’ in Katja S Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks and Loveday Hodson (eds), The UK and 
European Human Rights : A Strained Relationship? (Hart Press, 2015) 3. 
103 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 
opened for signature 3 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force on 14 October 1966) (‘ICSID 
Convention’). 
104 Mariana Durney, ‘Legal Effects and Implications of the Denunciation of the ICSID Convention on 
Unilateral Consent Contained in Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Perspective from Latin American 
Cases’ (2013) 17(1) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 221, 234. 
105 ‘Bolivia Denounces ICSID Convention’ (2007) 46 ILM 973. 
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in 2009 and 2012 respectively.106 The reasons stated for withdrawing echoed certain 
criticisms developed in the academic literature and domestic public opinion against 
ICSID and the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system in general.107 For 
instance, the then Bolivian Minister of Legal Defence highlighted the following 
features: ‘pro-business’ partiality of arbitrations; closed-door proceedings; their 
excessive costs and the inclusion of lucrum cessans in the quantification of damages.108  
Ecuador and Venezuela gave similar justifications, but also added that being 
members of an ISDS institution would be in conflict with their own constitutions.109 For 
its part, Ecuador claimed that the jurisdiction of ISDS tribunals would have clashed 
with its recently adopted 2008 Constitution,110 while Venezuela pointed to a provision 
of its 1999 Constitution limiting the validity of foreign claims on public contracts 
outside domestic courts.111 Regardless of the substance of these claims, the very fact 
 
106 In addition to that, the three states also terminated several (but not all) bilateral investment treaties. See 
UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org>. To date, Venezuela has 
only terminated its bilateral investment treaty with the Netherlands. 
107 For a compelling analysis see M Sornarajah, Resistance and Change in the International Law on 
Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
108 E Arismendi, ‘La Experiencia del Estado Plurinational de Bolivia en el Centro de Arreglos de 
Differencias Relativas a Inversiones (CIADI)’, 
<http://www.ohadac.com/telechargement/bibliographie/10/0/experiencia-boliviana-en-el-ciadi-en-el-
centro-de-arreglos-de-diferencias-relativas-a-inversiones.arismendi-elizabeth.pdf>. See also R Palanco 
Lazo, ‘Two Worlds Apart: The Changing Features of International Investment Agreements in Latin 
America’ in Attila Tanzi and others (eds), International Investment Law in Latin America: Problems and 
Prospects (Brill Nijhoff 2016) 68-97, 76. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, arts 339, 416(12) and 422, 
<https://www.oas.org/juridico/pdfs/mesicic4_ecu_const.pdf>. The latter article explicitly prohibiting the 
adoption of international investment agreements, apart from regional ones. 
111 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, art 151, 
<http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/normativa_electoral/constitucion/titulo4.php#cap1sec5>. After the 
denunciation, Bolivia’s 2009 Constitution made expressed preference to prioritising national to foreign 
investment and prohibiting foreign jurisdiction. See Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Art. 
320(1). 
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that they were raised signals the discord between an international regime, which ICSID 
helped to juridify, and domestic democratic orders.112 
Indeed, the role of ICSID in juridification goes beyond its internal structures and 
functions. While these consist of promoting an effective dispute settlement system for 
foreign investors and states according to the application of protection standards under 
the consent of member states,113 its operation is also deeply nested in the complex 
bundle of international investment treaties, national investment laws and investor-state 
contracts.114 In fact, ICSID’s influence in developing international investment law could 
not happen without the mushrooming of international investment agreements since the 
1990s,115 and the interpretations of substantive standards and procedural rules given by 
its tribunals.116  
One notable example is the expanded content of the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
standard, the most invoked in ISDS arbitrations. This standard first appeared in 
international investment treaties as an indeterminate obligation of conduct on the part of 
the state hosting the investment, whose specific content followed a progressive 
expansion from its hazy formulations under customary and treaty law.117 In this regard, 
the role of ICSID tribunals has been crucial in producing a clearer definition of the 
 
112 For a more detailed analysis see Carlos Bellei Tagle, ‘Arbitraje De Inversiones En América Latina: De 
La Hostilidad a La Búsqueda de Nuevas Alternativas’ in Attila Tanzi et al (eds), International Investment 
Law in Latin America Problems and Prospects (Brill Martinus Nijhoff, 2016) 98, 115–125. 
113 Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States, 
opened for signature 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force 14 October 1966) (‘ICSID 
Convention’). 
114 For a compelling analysis of how this substantive role was shaped through the leading work of 
ICSID’s Secretary Generals and World Bank’s legal counsels see Sergio Puig, ‘Emergence & Dynamism 
in International Organizations: ICSID, Investor-State Arbitration & International Investment Law’ (2012) 
44 Georgetown Journal of International Law 531. 
115 But also of national laws allowing for ISDS mechanisms, including ICSID, as well as investor-state 
contracts containing arbitration clauses. 
116 The majority of known ISDS arbitrations has taken place under ICSID. See UNCTAD, Word 
Investment Report (2017) <http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf>, 115. 
117 Sornarajah, above n 107, 247–250. 
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standard118 and in expanding its reach to additional sub-categories,119 which restrict the 
conduct of the host state towards the foreign investor in ways that could hardly be 
foreseen at the time of the adoption of international investment treaties. For instance, 
following the path of other tribunals, in Occidental v. Ecuador the arbitrators found that 
the fair and equitable treatment standard contained an obligation of proportionality on 
the state towards foreign investors.120 The tribunal awarded almost USD 1.8 billion in 
damages to the claimant after recognizing that the expropriation of the investor’s assets 
was a disproportionate reaction to a breach of Ecuadorian law and the contract entered 
into by the foreign investor, despite the fact that both Ecuadorian law and the investor-
state contract allowed for such discretionary power of the Ecuadorian President.121 
Yet, ICSID’s contribution to the juridification of the international investment regime 
went beyond law-making through interpretation: ICSID itself has also provided an 
institutional platform for an extended and complex community of professionals 
involved in forms of expert rule, to the extent that Sands has recently labelled it a 
‘capturing’ of the regime, where high legal fees are charged and ‘double hatting’ is 
practised.122 
 
118 Interpretation relying on essentially one case under the US-Mexico Claims. See Técnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States (Award) (2003) ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2, [154], re-interpreting L. F. H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States (1926) 
RIAA Vol IV 60. Sornarajah, above n 107. 
119 Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment: Today’s Contours’ (2014) 12(1) Santa Clara Journal of 
International Law 7. 
120 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration And Production Company v. The 
Republic of Ecuador (Award) (2012) ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11. The request for arbitration was filed in 
May 2006, a year before the ALBA meeting declaring the future exits. 
121 Ibid., [396]–[409]. The applicability of the proportionality test was based on both an interpretation of 
the fair and equitable treatment standard in the international investment treaty, and on Ecuadorian 
constitutional law. 
122 Philippe Sands, ‘Reflections on International Judicialization’ (2016) 27(4) European Journal of 
International Law 885, 893. The term ‘double hatting’ refers to the situation where arbitrators can work 
as party counsels, expert witnesses and tribunal secretaries in other disputes: see Malcolm Langford, 
Daniel Behn and Runar Hilleren Lie, ‘The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration’ 
(2017) 20(2) Journal of International Economic Law 301. 
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Recalling the various claims made by the three exiting states above, the links 
between the juridification of the international investment regime, ICSID and state exits 
come to the fore. The latter are an attempt to escape the direct effect of international 
obligations contracted under the IO (the organization system) and their effect on 
applying and enforcing juridified standards of international investment protection in the 
wider function system. However, also in this case, juridification has extended the 
normative effects of the regime beyond issues of membership loss and treaty 
withdrawal.123 Indeed, under the initiative of Ecuador, the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) has set up a high-level working group to consider the establishment 
of an alternative centre for settling international investment disputes.124 While the 
working group is currently negotiating a draft convention, which includes the 
establishment of a permanent tribunal,125 recent commentaries report that the proposal 
replicates in essence key features of ICSID,126 including the possibility of arbitration for 
foreign nationals from states that are not members of UNASUR.127 
Overall, the current situation illustrates how the institutional mechanisms of ICSID, 
which the three states have pointed at to justify their exits, reappear in the proposals for 
an alternative initiative under UNASUR. Moreover, the jurisprudence of ICSID 
 
123 A legal consequence connected to withdrawals from ICSID is the continued jurisdiction of arbitral 
tribunals due to the ‘sunset clauses’ of the ICSID Convention (arts 71-72). See Durney, above n 104.; 
Antonio R Parra, ‘Participation in the ICSID Convention’ (2013) 28(1) ICSID Review - Foreign 
Investment Law Journal 169. 
124 Bellei Tagle, above n 112, 125. 
125 UNASUR, ‘XIII Reunión Presencial del Grupo de Trabajo de Expertos de Alto Nivel sobre Solución 
de Controversias en Materia de Inversiones De UNASUR’ (2016), <http://docs.unasursg.org/>.  
126 Javier Echaide, ‘Inversiones y Solución de Controversias: El Proyecto Dentro de La Unasur y 
Propuestas Alternativas’ (2017) 17 Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 369. 
127 A similar approach to the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. See Fach Gómez, Katia and Catharine Titi, 
‘El Centro De Solución De Controversias En Materia De Inversiones De Unasur: Comentarios Sobre El 
Borrador De Acuerdo Constitutivo’ (2016) 7(3) Investment Treaty News Quarterly 
<https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd-itn-august-2016-english.pdf>. 
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tribunals on substantive legal standards might also influence interpretations made by 
arbitral tribunals set up under the proposed regional dispute settlement centre. 
 
4.3. Exiting the Paris Agreement on climate change 
The third and final case concerns the US declared intention to exit the 2015 Paris 
Agreement on climate change and its institutional regime. It highlights the normative 
effects of juridification from a treaty-based institutional regime128 on the exiting state, 
which have led to the strengthening of linkages between its sub-national entities (mostly 
states and cities) and the environmental goals and processes established under the 
Agreement’s umbrella. This influence could not happen without the decisions and 
processes established by the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), accepted by actors other than 
state parties as the central regulatory framework for global action on climate change 
beyond inter-state relations. Under systems theory lenses, the organization system 
(COP) of the treaty-based regime has extended its normative reach to the wider function 
 
128 The term regime here defines the lex specialis of the three multilateral climate change treaties and the 
numerous decisions and institutional processes under their respective treaty bodies, generally named 
Conferences of the Parties (COPs). The treaties are the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) 
(‘UNFCCC’); Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened 
for signature 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 162 (entered into force 16 February 2005); and Paris 
Agreement, opened for signature 12 December 2015, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (12 December 
2015) 21 (entered into force 4 November 2016). See the approach of Cinnamon P Carlarne, Kevin R Gray 
and Richard Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2016). As to the ‘soft’ institutional nature of COPs, which are not generally regarded 
IOs, see Robin R Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94(4) The 
American Journal of International Law 623. 
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system of the transnational regime complex for climate change, which comprises the 
actions and informal linkages of non-state actors.129 
In June 2017, the US declared its intention to exit the 2015 Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change with a press statement of its President. 130 In the following month, it 
submitted a communication to the UN Secretary General, acting as Depositary of the 
treaty, of its intention to withdraw –an act not required under the withdrawal clause of 
the Agreement,131 but which has enabled the US to voice and clarify the rationale for a 
future exit. As made explicit both in the statement and the communication, the US 
Administration perceives the agreement struck in Paris as unfair, due to the allegedly 
disproportional financial burdens that the state will likely endure should it remain in the 
regime. According to the statement, the Agreement works ‘to the exclusive benefit of 
other countries, leaving American workers (…) and taxpayers to absorb the cost in 
terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic 
production.’132 While such a cost/benefit narrative recalls the earlier US refusal to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol in 2001,133 the President’s statement also highlights unspecified 
‘legal and constitutional issues’ related to the implementation of the Agreement and 
recognizes in the future withdrawal ‘a reassertion of America’s sovereignty’.134 On its 
part, the communication of the US Department of State clarifies that the strategy behind 
 
129 Kenneth W. Abbott, ‘The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2012) 30(4) 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 571. 
130 The White House, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (1 June 2017) 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord>. 
131 Art. 28(1, 2) stipulates that withdrawal can take effect only after three years since the entry into force 
of the Agreement, and that the notification of withdrawal will take effect after one year from its date of 
receipt. 
132 Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, above n 121. 
133 Cass R Sunstein, ‘Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of  Two Protocols’ (2007) 31 Harvard 
Environmental Law Review 1. 
134 Ibid. 
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the threat of withdrawal is to ‘re-engage’ in the Agreement ‘if the United States can 
identify terms that are more favorable to it’.135 In essence, while not stopping its 
participation under the UNFCCC/PA treaty bodies and processes, the US appears to 
strategically use its non-implementation136 of the Agreement and threat of withdrawal to 
revise its future contribution to carbon mitigation and other commitments under the 
regime.137 
If the dissatisfaction of the US with the Paris Agreement is explicit, the relationship 
between its threatened withdrawal and the juridification of the regime is perhaps subtler. 
In fact, the Paris Agreement should not just be seen as the outcome of the 21st meeting 
of the UNFCCC COP but also as the final milestone of a lengthy and convoluted 
negotiation path which started in 2007 with a COP Decision in Bali.138 The following 
COP negotiations and technical activities of other UNFCCC subsidiary bodies have led 
to new regulatory processes and outcomes under the form of COP decisions and 
technical guidance instruments.139 These have established clear boundaries for 
negotiating the final outcome of the Paris Agreement, given that some of its procedural 
obligations were already envisioned and structured in previous COP decisions.140 
 
135 Communication Regarding Intent To Withdraw From Paris Agreement (4 August 2017) U.S. 
Department of State <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm>. 
136 In concurrence to these declarations, the Federal Government has also started a reform process of its 
climate change policies. See Michael Mehling, ‘A New Direction for US Climate Policy: Assessing the 
First 100 Days of Donald Trump’s Presidency’ (2017) 11(1) Carbon & Climate Law Review 3. 
137 This strategic use of the ‘exit threat’ is well acknowledged in the literature and in the previous practice 
of the US. See, for instance, Magliveras, above n 6, 100–101. 
138 Bali Action Plan, Decision 1/CP.13, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1.  
139 Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2017) 97–117. 
140 To give but two examples, the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action clarified that the outcome 
of negotiations should have taken the form of a ‘legal instrument or agreed legal outcome with legal 
force.’; and the 2013 COP in Warsaw set up via a decision the process of ‘intended nationally determined 
contributions’ in reducing emissions, which the Paris Agreement makes obligatory through the 
submission of Nationally Determined Contributions. See, respectively, Establishment of an Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, Decision 1/CP.17, UN Doc. 
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However, the normative effects of juridification under the UNFCCC institutional 
regime have also manifested in the form of reaction and resistance to a potential US 
withdrawal from some of its sub-national entities. For instance, in the aftermath of the 
federal government decision, several US states have created the United States Climate 
Alliance, an initiative ‘committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions consistent with 
the goals of the Paris Agreement’.141 According to its principles, states participating are 
to ‘implement policies that advance the goals of the Paris Agreement, aiming to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by at least 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025’.142 In 
addition to states, the Climate Mayors initiative has gathered 402 US cities, representing 
almost 70 million US citizens. This association declared that it will ‘adopt, honor, and 
uphold the commitments to the goals enshrined in the Paris Agreement’.143 The linkage 
between US sub-national entities and the international climate change regime has also 
taken an institutional form, since the launch by the UNFCCC Secretariat of the Non-
state Actor Zone for Climate Action, which registers and publishes climate-related 
commitment and initiatives by a wide range of non-state actors.144 All of these actions 
show how the norms stemming from the COP have gone beyond the formal state 
participation to an organization regime to extend to a function regime.  
 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, [2]; and Further advancing the Durban Platform, Decision 1/CP.19, UN Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, [1(b)]. 
141 United States Climate Alliance, <https://www.usclimatealliance.org/alliance-principles> (italics 
added). 
142 This target corresponds to the one submitted by the previous US Administration under the Paris 
Agreement. See (untitled) 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20of%20America%20First/
U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf>  
143 See Climate Mayors, 406 US Climate Mayors commit to adopt, honor and uphold Paris Climate 
Agreement goals, <http://climatemayors.org/actions/paris-climate-agreement>.  
144 See UNFCCC, NAZCA Tracking Climate Action, <http://climateaction.unfccc.int/>. Harro van Asselt, 
‘The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and Compliance under the Paris 
Agreement’ (2016) 6(1–2) Climate Law 91. 
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Despite the US intent to exit the Paris Agreement and the organization system of its 
treaty body,145 the principles, targets and processes enshrined therein might still be 
effective throughout parts of the US territory via their parallel acceptance by non-state 
actor initiatives and institutional linkages with the wider transnational function regime.  
 
5. A new variable in the ‘exit’ equation?  
By looking at the juridification of IOs and its repercussions on international and 
domestic legal regimes, the perspective shifts from debates on the legality of exit and 
the consequences between the exiting state and the IO to the normative effects of the IO 
on the juridified function system. Under this wider perspective, a regulatory dilemma 
suddenly becomes more vivid. In the three illustrative cases, juridified IOs, acting 
according to the legal codes of their constitutive instruments, have failed to take into 
account strongly held domestic visions, thus contributing to decisions on exits. 
Moreover, exiting states have been left with no guarantee of avoiding some normative 
effects from juridification on the function system and, as a result, this has limited the 
effects of exiting (or threatening to exit) the IO.146 These outcomes relate to two key 
aspects of systems theory: the operational closure of juridified legal systems and the 
IO’s influence on legal sub-regimes, which are function systems. 
Also, the same cases evidence two legal techniques of juridification: third-party 
interpretation on the one hand, and the extended reach of norms and processes through 
 
145 It is formally named ‘The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris 
Agreement’: see Paris Agreement, art 16. 
146 Certainly, there will always be important consequences from an exit. For instance, in the case of US 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the compliance and transparency processes of the latter will not 
apply to sub-national entities and these will not be subject to international monitoring and accountability 
for not complying with standards and processes under the Agreement. 
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the work of non-state actors on the other. As to the first, the examples of the 
interpretation of the prohibition of inhuman treatment in human rights law and the fair 
and equal treatment standard in international investment law highlight the role of 
independent expert-rule in deciding vaguely formulated standards with a teleological 
approach.147 In the absence of judicialization, norm interpretation is normally left to 
each member state, according to the argumentative techniques under the vocabulary of 
general international law. This enables states to voice political views with their own 
interpretations,148 with the result that, in a lightly juridified IO, general international law 
enables informal ‘coupling’ with domestic politics; something that does not happen with 
an IO working as an organization system. Being an autopoietic system means that the 
interpretation provided by autonomous bodies does not need to take into account 
domestic justifications. This is a choice purely dependent on the construction of what is 
a valid legal argument in the function system, as two of the examples covered show. 
The Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission have indirectly149 
banned the death penalty contrary to the letter of the international human rights treaties 
and to what was originally consented to. In so doing, the domestic views on criminal 
policies were considered but not as an element of the legal reasoning.150 Likewise, in the 
international investment regime, the combined effect of international investment treaties 
and the ICSID Convention makes it difficult for states to pursue domestic policy 
 
147 For human rights see George Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy’ 
in Andreas Føllesdal, Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe: The European Court of 
Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 106. For 
international investment law see Sornarajah, above n 107, 246–299.   
148 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006) 333. 
149 Helfer, above n 38, 1874. 
150 Pratt v. Jamaica, Communication Nos. 210/1986 & 225/1987, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th 
Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 222, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989). 
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alternatives to the political economy promoted by prevalent interpretations of 
international standards.151 
On the second technique, we noticed how in systems theory IOs are not only social 
systems, but they also participate in wider function systems comprising multiple actors, 
including domestic actors. This points at another limit of understanding exits only 
through the functionalist lens of international institutional law and applicable 
international obligations. Under the proposed framework, non-state actors voluntarily 
participate in the function system, as enablers of specific normative effects and in 
recognition of the centrality of the organization system. In the case of the Caribbean 
states, the Privy Council was the major domestic vector of the integration of legal 
solutions created within international human rights law.152 The British judges reached 
this solution by assuming that the norms laid out in the domestic Bill of Rights should 
be interpreted in light of the international equivalent,153 so that the domestic legal order 
would absorb but also influence the international regime. This was not a necessary 
conclusion. It was possible, for instance, for the Privy Council to decide that the specific 
constitutional norm had first to be interpreted within the context of domestic 
institutions.154 Regarding the Paris Agreement, sub-national actors, such as cities or US 
state governments, voluntarily intervened and joined the process-based regime of COP 
 
151 Jonathan Bonnitcha, Lauge N Skovgaard Poulsen and Michael Waibel, The Political Economy of the 
Investment Treaty Regime (Oxford University Press, 2017) 93–125. 
152 Schabas, above n 88. 
153 Pratt v. Attorney-General for Jamaica [1994] 2 AC 1. 
154 This was for instance the approach taken by the British Supreme Court in R. v Horncastle (Michael 
Christopher) [2009] UKSC 14. In that case, the Court refused to follow the established case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights to choose an interpretation more in line with the common law 
understanding of the issue. Interestingly, this led to a change of approach of the Strasbourg Court. See 
Nicolas Bratza, ‘The Relationship between the UK Courts and Strasbourg’ (2011) 5 European Human 
Rights Law Review 505. 
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meetings outside the structures of membership, but still making key IO norms and 
processes effective in the wider transnational regime complex for climate change. 
All the elements and techniques discussed here show that, if member states wish to 
exit from IOs in reaction to their juridification, this might not lead to a full escape, as it 
would be expected under more formalistic assumptions. 
 
Conclusions  
With a view to complement the perspective offered by functionalism and formalistic 
approaches to unilateral exits from IOs, this paper has focused on juridification as a 
phenomenon of legal growth within IOs and a possible cause of state exits. We have 
used systems theory as a sociological tool to better understand the impact of 
formalization through juridification, coupled with informal techniques of law-making. 
While this approach cannot say anything about the legal validity of the effects created 
by IO acts on the wider function regimes, it offers a solid framework to understand 
these effects from a legal systems perspective. 
Accordingly, by looking at cases of highly juridified IOs we found that, while exits 
are indeed about withdrawing from a multilateral treaty with the ensuing cessation of 
membership, as well as rights and obligations, states wishing to exit might only partially 
achieve the desired aims of full disentanglement from the IO’s internal law; instead, 
they will still be somehow affected under the wider regime where the IO operates. 
Awareness of juridification via bolstered expert rule, bureaucratization, and 
participation of non-state actors, can lead to more complete judgements on the tensions 
between domestic and supranational systems. So, those advocating for centrifugal pulls 
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from IO-centred orders should further assess to what extent full detachment can be 
achieved and what other measures, other than formal exits, would be needed for 
achieving the exit goal. By the same token, a more complete framing of the legal 
techniques for juridification can help those contributing to it to better tame these 
tensions. However, the question remains as to whether this managerial approach would 
nonetheless result in even more bureaucratization and expert rule, confirming the view 
of juridification as an endless spiral, growing out of a legal mindset that all international 
lawyers somehow share. 
